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Executive Summary
Purpose To encourage the private sector's participation in civilian space activi-ties, the President's fiscal year 1990 budget proposed private financing
for seven key projects in the space shuttle and space station programs.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) estimated
that these projects would cost well over $700 million between fiscal
years 1990 and 1994 if the government funded them. Because this was
the first effort of this type, GAo reviewed NASA's actions to determine the
feasibility and appropriateness of obtaining private financing for these
projects.
Background	 NASA's budget, which was at the $9 billion level in fiscal year 1988, hasincreased each year since and is expected to continue to do so in the
1990s. The agency projects that its fiscal year 1993 request will be over
$19 billion. Private financing of space projects was intended to help
reduce the rate of increase in NASA's budget in the near term. Overall,
these initiatives were intended to actively involve the private sector in
developing space projects into profitable ventures and in sharing the
government's development costs and risks in return for a share of poten-
tial revenues.
The seven projects in the Administration's private financing initiatives
were an advanced solid rocket motor production facility, a weightless-
ness laboratory, a space station payload processing facility, an observa-
tional instruments processing laboratory, a robotic arm for the space
station, a space station docking system, and part of the extended dura-
tion orbiter. In anticipation of obtaining private financing for them,
NAsA's budget request and estimates for fiscal years 1990 to 1994 were
reduced by about $747 million. The reduction in the fiscal year 1990
budget alone was about $ 208 million.
Results in Brief	 Efforts to develop commercial interest in seven NASA projects were gen-erally unsuccessful because most of them were not good candidates for
commercialization. The projects were selected for commercialization and
funds were removed from NASA's budget request before the likelihood of
their success was adequately screened.
In choosing projects for possible commercialization, one important
screening criterion is a comparison of the government's cost to develop
projects by using private or government financing. Such a detailed anal-
ysis was done to compare the costs of private and government financing
Page 2	 GAO/NSIAD-90-147 Space Projects
Executive Summary
of the advanced solid rocket motor production facility. NASA recom-
mended approval of the private financing option based on this analysis.
However, while most of the analysis was well done, it did not ade-
quately address the government's exposure to possible increases in
short-term commercial interest rates. In addition, the analysis included
cases where the private borrowing rate was assumed to be cheaper than
the government's borrowing rate—an unlikely possibility.
Principal Findings
Most Projects Were Not	 The Office of Management and Budget and NASA selected the seven
Good Candidates	 projects and removed them from NASA's budget request before their com-
mercial feasibility and the cost-effectiveness of private financing were
adequately studied. Subsequent evaluations showed that private con-
cerns were not willing to invest in most of the projects because they
perceived few or no commercial markets for them. In addition, about
half of the projects were believed to be too far along in development to
modify them for commercial use without added expense and delay. Also,
the risk of development within estimated costs was judged to be too high
for a few projects.
NASA received financing proposals for the four facility construction
projects, but it rejected three of them because they would have been
significantly more costly than government financing. NASA recommended
approval of the remaining proposal for funding of the advanced solid
rocket motor production facility. The proposal was more expensive than
using government financing, but NASA concluded that the cost difference
of about 4 percent, or $16 million, was insignificant.
Some Projects Have Been	 Ultimately, only the project involving part of the extended duration
Delayed	 orbiter was commercialized. All of the unsuccessful commercializationprojects have been reinstated in NASA's budget. Four of them—the
weightlessness laboratory, the space station payload processing facility,
the observational instruments processing laboratory, and the space sta-
tion docking system—are not expected to receive any significant
funding for this fiscal year. These projects have been delayed.
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Problems With the In its analyses of the proposal for private financing of the advanced
Analyses of the Advanced solid rocket motor production facility, NASA considered a wide range of
Solid Rocket Motor Plant possible private interest and government discount rates, but did not ade-
Proposal quately address the interest rate risk associated with financing a long-term project using short-term money. NASA's analyses also included cases
where the private borrowing rate was unrealistically assumed to be
lower than the government's rate.
The private financing proposal called for funding the construction of the
facility using 30- to 180-day loans that would be refinanced when due at
current rates for a 7.5-year period. NASA recommended approval of this
proposal and would have proceeded with it if Congress had not returned
the project to NASA's budget and funded it in fiscal year 1990.
Recommendations	 GAo recommends that the Administrator, NASA,
establish and consistently apply appropriate screening criteria for use in
identifying projects for commercialization;
in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget, keep such
projects in the budget until they are adequately evaluated as private
financing candidates and such financing is found or is judged to be
highly likely; and
ensure that financing options for future projects are properly analyzed.
Agency Comments and NASA and the Office of Management and Budget generally believe thatthe GAo analysis and report provide a useful review of these space com-GAO's Evaluation	 mercialization efforts. They believe this review will be helpful in the
future, given the newness of such activities and the broad variety of
available financing options. The Office of Management and Budget did
not directly comment on the recommendations, while NASA objected to
being the sole addressee of the draft recommendation to keep projects in
the budget until they are adequately evaluated as private financing can-
didates. NASA suggested that GAo either withdraw the recommendation
or address it to the Office of Management and Budget.
GAo recognizes that the Office of Management and Budget is a key
player in finalizing NASA's budget. The recommendation in the draft
report was addressed only to NASA because of its primary responsibility
to justify its budget. However, because of the Office of Management and
Budget's position that withholding the projects from the budget request
was part of a deliberate strategy to demonstrate the Administration's
Page 4	 GAO/NSUD-90-147 Space Projects
Executive Summary
commitment to pursue commercial financing, GAo modified the recom-
mendation to NASA to include consultation with the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
NASA's fiscal year 1990 budget request proposed using private funds to
help develop seven space shuttle and space station projects. This pro-
posal was a key initiative in encouraging private sector investment in
space activities. The commercialization of space projects is intended to
actively involve the private sector in developing them into profitable
ventures and in sharing the government's development costs and risks.
In return, private firms would receive a share of potential revenues.
If successful, such initiatives would also have a moderating effect on the
rate of growth in NASA's budget, which has been increasing significantly
in recent years. The growth trend is expected to continue in the 1990s.
Figure 1.1 shows the growth in NASA's budget from its fiscal year 1988
level of $9 billion to an estimated request for $19.3 billion in fiscal year
1993.
Figure 1.1: NASA's Budget and Budget
Requests, Fiscal Years 1988-93
20 Billions of Dollars
Fiscal Years
Note: Data estimated for fiscal years 1990-93.
Source: Budget of the U.S. government, fiscal year 1991.
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Descriptions and NASA proposed private financing for four facility construction projectsand three development projects. The four construction projects includedEstimated
Development Costs of an advanced solid rocket motor production facility, to be located in
Candidate Projects Yellow Creek, Mississippi. It will manufacture improved solid rocketmotors used to help power the space shuttle into orbit. The advanced
rocket motors are expected to be more powerful and reliable than the
ones currently used.
• a neutral buoyancy (weightlessness) laboratory, consisting primarily of
a large tank of water, which will simulate the weightless environment in
which astronauts will build, operate, and maintain the space station.
The laboratory will be built at the Johnson Space Center, near Houston,
Texas, headquarters for astronaut training.
• a space station payload processing facility, to be located at the Kennedy
Space Center on Florida's east-central coast. It will be used to inspect
and prepare elements of the space station for launch and assembly in
orbit. Later, the facility will perform a similar function for cargo carried
to and from the space station.
• an observational instruments processing laboratory, to be located at the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California. The laboratory will
be used to develop and assemble instruments for a wide array of mis-
sions, including earth observation, planetary exploration, and astro-
nomical studies.
The three development projects included
a space station flight telerobotic servicer that will be attached to the
space station. This mobile robotic arm will be used to perform mainte-
nance and other activities outside the station.
a space station docking system that will join the shuttle or other vehi-
cles to the space station to allow the transfer of personnel and supplies.
a cryogenic pallet for the extended duration orbiter. The pallet will be
carried in the space shuttle's cargo bay to provide additional supplies of
liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen for power generation and life sup-
port. This pallet is a part of a set of modifications to a shuttle orbiter
that will extend the current limit on shuttle flights from about 10 days
to 16 days.
NASA estimated the development cost of these seven projects at $794 mil-
lion between fiscal years 1990 and 1994 if they are fully funded by the
government (see table 1.1).
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Table 1.1: NASA's Estimated
Development Cost for the Seven Projects
	 Dollars in millions(Fiscal Years 1990-94)
Fiscal year
Facilitiesa 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total
Advanced solid rocket motor
production facility $60 $60 $60 $93 $0 $273
Weightlessness laboratory 30 0 0 0 0 30
Space station payload processing
facility 43 41 0 0 0 84
Observational instruments
processing laboratory 14 0 0 0 0 14
Projects
Flight telerobotic servicer arm 45 45 50 45 45 230
Space station docking system 7 27 28 45 13 120
Extended duration orbiter cryogenic
pallet 25 15 3 0 0 43
Total $224 $188 $141 $183 $58 $794
aThe facilities' estimates do not include capital equipment.
Source: NASA.
During budget discussions with the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), NASA agreed to seek private financing for the seven projects. OMB
then deducted most of the projects' estimated development costs from
NASA's budget request and budget estimates for fiscal years 1990
through 1994, a reduction of approximately $747 million. The reduction
in the fiscal year 1990 budget alone was $208 million. The President's
budget request to Congress for fiscal year 1990 mentioned these projects
as private financing initiatives.
Objectives, Scope, and We examined NASA's efforts to determine the feasibility and appropriate-
ness of obtaining private financing for the seven space projects. WeMethodology	 interviewed NASA headquarters, OMB, and Congressional Budget Office
(cBo) personnel to gain an understanding of the initiatives, the basis for
their selection as candidate projects, and the results of NASA's and cBo's
analyses of these projects. We also interviewed an OMB economist who is
an expert on OMB Circular A-104, which sets out the factors involved in
deciding whether to lease or purchase an asset and presents a model for
conducting a present value analysis.'
'A present value analysis compares the relative values of alternative actions that have different
timing patterns to their flows of revenues and/or costs. This technique takes into account the time
value of money and allows alternative actions to be compared on an equal economic basis.
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We obtained detailed information about specific projects and their cur-
rent status from NASA program office personnel at headquarters and at
field centers. In addition, we discussed the initiatives with officials from
NAsA's Office of the Comptroller and Congressional Relations Office to
determine how the initiatives had affected NASA's budget.
We visited NASA's Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas, and Marshall
Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama. At Johnson Space Center, we
obtained information from program and procurement officials respon-
sible for the weightlessness laboratory and the extended duration
orbiter. At Marshall Space Flight Center, we discussed with program
and procurement officials the efforts to privately finance the advanced
solid rocket motor production facility and reviewed a NASA analysis of
the private financing proposal for the facility. We also obtained infor-
mation from Kennedy Space Center officials about their attempts to find
private financing for the space station payload processing facility.
NASA and OMB comments on a draft of this report are included as appen-
dixes I and II, respectively. These comments are addressed, where
appropriate, throughout the report. Our review was performed between
August 1989 and March 1990 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
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The candidates for private financing in fiscal year 1990 were selected
and removed from NASA's budget request before their commercial via-
bility was determined and the cost-effectiveness of using private
financing was properly evaluated. Except for the extended duration
orbiter cryogenic pallet, the projects failed to attract private investment
because (1) commercial demand for the services to be offered by the
projects did not exist, (2) some projects were too far along in their devel-
opment to be considered for commercialization without incurring rede-
sign costs and causing delays, and (3) the risks of successful
development within estimated costs were too high. Furthermore, private
financing would have significantly increased the government's cost for
some projects. In addition, NASA's safety concerns about two of the
projects caused it to limit consideration of potential investors to the cur-
rent contractors.
Ultimately, the unsuccessful commercialization projects were reincorpo-
rated into NASA's budget, and some of them have been delayed because
significant fiscal year 1990 funding has not been found for them.
NASA has agreed to a proposal from its current orbiter contractor to pri-
vately finance the extended duration orbiter cryogenic pallet, and NASA's
analysis of the proposal shows that the plan is cost-effective. The plan
allows NASA to defer paying the pallet's development costs.
NASA analyzed a proposal for private financing of the advanced solid
rocket motor production facility, concluded it was a viable option, and
was moving in that direction before being stopped by congressional
action. NASA's analysis did not adequately address the government's
exposure to the short-term interest rate risk. A rate increase could have
lead to substantial additional cost to the government for that facility
under the private financing option.
Commercialization
Projects Were Selected
OMB and NASA jointly agreed to the seven projects for commercialization
during budget discussions in late 1988 to reduce NASA's fiscal year 1990
budget request and to help achieve the goal of increasing private invest-
Before Being ment in space. The projects were removed from NASA's budget request
Adequately Evaluated
	 y before their suitability for commercialization had been adequately eval-uated. Subsequent evaluations by NASA personnel and consultants
showed that six of the seven projects were not good candidates for pri-
vate financing. (See table 2. 1.)
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Table 2.1: Reasons Why Projects Were
Not Good Candidates for Lack of Projects too High Private financing
Commercialization commercial far along in technical significantly
demand development risk more costly
Advanced solid rocket
motor production
facility X
Weightlessness
laboratory X X
Space station payload
processing facility X X
Observational
instruments
processing laboratory X X X
Robotic arm X X X
Space station docking
system X X
In addition, NASA officials were concerned about the potential safety
implications of introducing new contractors for the extended duration
orbiter cryogenic pallet and the space station docking system. Conse-
quently, NASA limited its search for private developers on these projects
to the contractors already engaged.
Lack Of Commercial	 Commercial demand for the services the projects would offer is vital to
Demand
	
establishing a long-term financially successful operation and to the
sharing of the future financial burden on the government, which would
otherwise be the projects' sole customer. A lack of commercial demand
affected five projects. NASA found that commercial aerospace, construc-
tion, and finance companies were not willing to invest in four projects
because they perceived that few or no commercial markets existed. For
example, there are no specific commercial applications for the robotic
arm, and prospective investors' market surveys found no practical com-
mercial markets to justify investment. Also, NASA's market survey found
no interest in joint use or shared ownership of the weightlessness labo-
ratory. Although four commercial firms expressed interest in lending
the government the money for the facility, NASA did not accept these
proposals because they would have cost significantly more than govern-
ment financing.
NASA also determined that one of the five projects—the observational
instruments processing laboratory—was not amenable to shared use
and, therefore, decided not to seek private financing.
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Some Projects Too Far Into NASA had approved conceptual designs and begun detailed designs on
Development	 four projects when they were selected as commercialization candidates.To modify three of these projects for commercial uses, developers would
have had to do redesign work. This could have added costs and delayed
the projects. For example, at the time NASA initially solicited private
interest in the space station payload processing facility, the design was
60 percent complete. Three firms that indicated an interest in shared use
stated that the facility design would have to be modified. They felt that
the space NASA had allocated for commercial use would not be large
enough to meet their needs.
In the case of the observational instruments processing laboratory, NASA
had already completed preliminary engineering designs, selected a site
at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, hired an archi-
tect and engineer, and invested $1 million in the design process by the
time the project was selected as a commercialization candidate. Bringing
aboard a private investor at that stage could have delayed construction
and resulted in additional design costs if design changes were required
to adapt the facility to commercial use.
High Technological Risk 	 NASA also found that potential private sector investors were not willing
to invest in the robotic arm and the space station docking system
because they believed the technical risk was too high. Technical risk fac-
tors include whether equipment can be developed to accomplish the
stated task, whether development problems will arise and increase
costs, and whether the equipment developed will perform reliably.
NAsA's consultants concluded that the high technological risks of devel-
oping the robotic arm and the space station docking system would
frighten away most investors, who could invest in other, less chancy
ventures.
Space station funding problems and schedule delays also create uncer-
tainty that discourage private investment. One NASA consultant stated
that the space station docking system and the robotic arm are perceived
as highly risky from a business point of view because the "parent" pro-
gram, the space station, is perceived as vulnerable to budget cuts and
schedule delays. A potential developer of the space station payload
processing facility also confirmed this view.
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Private Financing Would NASA inquiries stimulated private financing proposals for five of the
Be Significantly More commercialization projects—the advanced solid rocket motor produc-
Costly to the Government tion facility, the weightlessness laboratory, the space station payloadprocessing facility, the observational instruments processing laboratory,
and the extended duration orbiter cryogenic pallet. Except for the
extended duration orbiter cryogenic pallet, the proposals did not offer to
invest in the projects, but rather to develop them for NASA in return for
long-term leases or mortgages.
NASA's economic analyses of these five projects showed that the private
financing offered for three of them would be significantly more expen-
sive than government financing. NASA, therefore, rejected the private
financing proposals for these projects.
NASA concluded that the private financing proposals for the solid rocket
motor production facility and for the extended duration orbiter cryo-
genic pallet were viable options and pursued them. These proposals are
discussed later in this report.
Only Current Contractors	 Two of the projects, the space station docking system and the extended
Acceptable for Safety- 	 duration orbiter cryogenic pallet, had critical safety considerations that
Critical Projects	 caused NASA to limit consideration of private development contractors tothose already working on the projects. NASA believed that using other
private developers would have created unacceptable safety risks.
Some commercial demand is forecast for the extended duration orbiter
cryogenic pallet, and NASA has negotiated a private financing arrange-
ment with its orbiter contractor. In return for financing pallet develop-
ment, the contractor will share in revenues generated from commercial,
extended duration shuttle flights. So far, NASA has identified one large-
scale commercial flight, which is scheduled for 1994. According to NASA,
there are also numerous potential smaller shared payloads.
After determining that no commercial demand existed for the space sta-
tion docking system, NASA officials opted not to seek private financing.
Page 15	 GAO/NSIAD-90-147 Space Projects
Chapter 2
Most Initiatives to Obtain Private Financing
for Space Projects Were Unsuccessful
Commercialization
Efforts Delayed Some
Except for the extended duration orbiter cryogenic pallet, the commer-
cialization projects have been ruled out for private financing. All of the
unsuccessful commercialization projects were returned to NASA's budget,
Space Projects and and NASA is funding them, or will attempt to do so. NASA's budget request
yscoura gMa  Discourage
Future Attempts
for fiscal year 1990 totaled $13.3 billion without significant funding for
the commercialization projects. Although NASA's appropriation for fiscal
year 1990 ultimately included funding for some of the projects,' the
total appropriation was only $12.4 billion. Thus, NASA had to contend
with a lower-than-requested appropriation and, at the same time, had to
attempt to find money for the unfunded projects.
Four of the unsuccessful commercialization projects—the space station
docking system, the weightlessness laboratory, the space station
payload processing facility, and the observational instruments
processing laboratory—may not receive any significant funding in fiscal
year 1990. These projects have been delayed, and any significant
funding for them has been put off to fiscal year 1991.
In addition to having an adverse effect on individual projects, the poor
results from the commercialization efforts could hamper future initia-
tives, and good commercialization candidates could languish. As pointed
out by a NASA consultant,
If NASA pursues non-commercially feasible systems on a commercial basis for polit-
ical or other reasons, viable alternative candidates for commercial projects may not
be pursued....
Industry may perceive that NASA is supporting token commercial space
development and only because of "off-budget financing" or other bene-
fits to the agency. Industry may be disillusioned with the possibility of
real commercialization, refusing to propose privately operated services.
We agree with these observations.
'For example, Congress appropriated $90 million for the advanced solid rocket motor production
facility and $80 million for the robotic arm.
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Problems With the As previously noted, NASA received private financing proposals for the
Analyses of the four facility construction projects, but rejected three of them becauseprivate financing would have cost the government significantly more
Private Financing than government financing. In the case of the advanced solid rocket
Proposal for the motor production facility, however, NASA analysts concluded after acomprehensive evaluation that, although private financing was moreAdvanced Solid expensive than government financing, the difference was not significant
Rocket Motor because it was well below the threshold of accuracy, given the method-
Production Facility ology and data used. Therefore, they recommended private financing.However, we found that, although the final analysis of the government's
financing options for the advanced solid rocket motor production
facility was, for the most part, properly done, it did not adequately
address the government's interest-rate risk. This risk could have
exposed the government to far higher costs than anticipated.
Also, in some cases, NASA's analyses implied that private borrowing
would cost less than U.S. government borrowing. History consistently
shows, however, that U.S. government borrowing is less costly than pri-
vate borrowing for the same borrowing period.
Private Financing	 NASA's request for proposal for the advanced solid rocket motor produc-
Recommended for the
	
tion facility required offerors to propose development and construction
Advanced Solid Rocket
	
of the production facility using government financing and private
financing. NASA's Source Evaluation Board made a detailed analysis ofMotor Production Facility cost proposals for each financial approach. The Board used a model that
a NASA consultant developed based on OMB's requirement for a "present
value" cost analysis.
From its analysis, the Board determined that private financing would
cost the government more than government financing on a present value
basis, but that the additional cost was insignificant given the overall
cost of the facility. NASA recommended the private financing option
because OMB had excluded funding for the motor facility from NASA's
budget request. NASA did not consider it possible to get additional appro-
priations and wanted to avoid delaying the project. Project managers
also noted that during tight budget periods, government-funded pro-
grams are often stretched out to reduce current year outlays. Stretching
out funding for the advanced solid rocket motor production facility
would have delayed production and increased the cost of the advanced
motor. It would have also required NASA to use more of the current, less
capable motors. According to NASA, continued use of the current motor
would increase the overall cost of the shuttle program.
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In its final present value analysis, NASA's baseline case used a private
interest rate of 10 percent and a government interest rate of 9.1 percent
to convert each year's payment to a present value. (See table 2.2.)2
Table 2.2: NASA's Present Value Cost
Estimates for the Advanced Solid Rocket Dollars in millions
Motor Production Facility	 Financing option
Year	 Government	 Private
1	 $41	 $1
2	 108	 9
3	 122	 19
4	 90	 99
5	 44	 91
6	 0	 79
7	 0	 67
8	 0	 56
Total	 $405	 $421
Source: NASA.
The analysts concluded that the present value cost difference of
$ 16 million in favor of government financing was not material. How-
ever, NASA's analysis did not adequately address the interest rate risk to
the government from using short-term, variable-rate financing. Also,
NASA's final analysis presented alternative cases that continued to use
the incorrect relationship between private and government interest
rates.
The private financing alternative NASA considered called for financing
project construction cost with short-term money (30- to 180-day com-
mercial paper), which would be refinanced when due, at prevailing
rates. This proposed approach meant that the private interest rate
would be subject to adjustment at least twice a year, or a minimum of
15 times during the 7.5-year payback period.
Although NASA's analysis included sensitivity tests that used a variety of
private and government interest rates, it did not directly highlight the
inherent risk to the government of using short-term, variable-rate
financing. The government's cost for financing additional debt would
depend on the prevailing short-term private interest rate. The govern-
ment would gamble that commercial rates would not increase during the
2Representatives of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation requested cor-
rection of the interest rate/discount rate relationship.
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period when the project was privately financed because any such
increase would increase the government's overall cost, perhaps by a sig-
nificant amount.
The gravity of the government's risk can be seen in the seesawing of
commercial interest rates that can occur over much shorter periods of
time than the 7.5-year period for the private financing option for the
advanced solid rocket motor production facility. For example, from
1987 to 1989, the 3-month commercial borrowing rate increased by more
than 2 percentage points. NAsA's final analysis showed that every per-
centage point increase in the commercial borrowing rate would increase
the government's cost by about $15 million over a 7.5-year period.
In addition to the baseline case, NASA presented two alternative cases in
its final present value analysis. These alternative cases continued to rely
on the incorrect relationship between private and government interest
rates. One case was based on equal rates of 10 percent for both private
and government borrowing. The other case used a higher government
borrowing rate (11 percent) than private borrowing rate (10 percent).
These alternative cases reduced, and then eliminated, the baseline case's
cost advantage of government financing.
Under the equal 10-percent analysis, the government financing cost
advantage in the baseline case was cut in half—from $16 million to $8
million. Under the analysis using a higher government interest rate than
private interest rate, the cost advantage of the government financing
option disappeared, and there was a slight cost advantage of $2 million
for the private financing option. Presenting such alternative cases gives
them an aura of legitimacy that they do not deserve. More important,
they can inappropriately influence management's decision. Only feasible
alternative cases should be presented.
Private Financing for As previously mentioned, NASA has agreed with its current orbiter con-
the Extended Duration tractor to privately finance the extended duration orbiter cryogenicpallet. The contractor offered to develop the pallet and to allow NASA to
Orbiter Cryogenic defer paying for it. The contractor will recover its cost of financing
Pallet pallet development by collecting a surcharge from certain users of theextended duration orbiter.
Specifically, the arrangement calls for the contractor to pay $53 million
for developing the pallet and to receive credit for about a $15 million
investment, representing its cost to finance that development. NASA will
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repay the development costs in three equal annual installments, begin-
ning in fiscal year 1992. The contractor will have the opportunity to
recoup its investment, and perhaps more, from a surcharge on commer-
cial customers' use of the extended duration orbiter over a period of
about 2 or more years.
The surcharge will be applied to commercial extended missions up to the
date that the Space Station Freedom is ready for human occupation
(currently scheduled for April 1996), or no later than December 1997.
The contractor could recover its $15 million investment from the one
dedicated commercial extended duration mission currently scheduled
for fiscal year 1994, provided that all 8 additional days in orbit are used
as presently planned. There are also numerous potential shared com-
mercial payloads, according to NASA. Surcharge revenues from all com-
mercial extended duration missions during the period would go to the
contractor. Overall, the contractor is taking the risk that the commercial
use of the extended duration orbiter will generate sufficient surcharge
revenues to recover its investment in the cryogenic pallet plus a reason-
able profit.
According to a NASA manager, the orbiter pallet surcharge would be in
addition to the costs NASA charges to recoup its shuttle operations costs,
and the surcharge would not affect NASA's pricing policy of charging cus-
tomers for costs of operations.
Conclusions
	
OMB and NASA jointly selected the seven projects for commercialization to
reduce NASA's fiscal year 1990 budget request and to help achieve the
goal of increasing private sector involvement in space projects. How
ever, the efforts to privately finance these seven projects did not
increase the commercial sector's involvement in space to the extent
desired.
Private financing of space projects may have the potential of increasing
commercial investment in space at an acceptable cost to the government.
The projects selected, however, were not a fair test of that potential pri-
marily because they were not properly screened; that is, neither their
suitability for commercialization nor the economic consequences of
seeking private financing for them were adequately evaluated before
selection. Only after selection were the evaluations and market tests
done showing that most of them were not viable candidates for private
financing. Decisions to remove projects from the budget and to seek
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their commercial development should be made only after careful
screening to determine whether adequate commercial demand exists,
development risks are commercially acceptable, and the cost- effective-
ness of such a decision is acceptable. Both NASA and OMB decided prema-
turely to remove these projects from the budget. Such premature
removal can unduly pressure NASA program personnel to justify the pur-
suit of private financing. Ultimately, such action can cause project
delays and increased costs when unsuccessful commercialization candi-
dates must subsequently be returned to the budget.
Numerous space projects are continually being planned and developed
by the government and, as long as there is a goal of increasing commer-
cial space activities, some of them may seem to offer opportunities for
private investment. An evaluation of candidates for private investment
early in their development, with the primary focus on their suitability
and cost-effectiveness as commercial ventures, would help prevent inap-
propriate selections and preclude significant development delays.
Assessments of the economic impact of changing from government to
private financing should use only realistic assumptions and should spe-
cifically address those risks that have potentially significant economic
consequences. Although very comprehensive in scope, NASA's present
value analyses of a proposal for privately financing the advanced solid
rocket motor production facility did not adequately do so. NASA needs to
see that economic analyses are correctly done to ensure appropriate
comparisons of government and private financing options for future
commercialization projects.
Recommendations	 We recommend that the Administrator, NASA,
establish and consistently apply appropriate screening criteria to iden-
tify projects for commercialization;
in consultation with OMB, keep such projects in the budget until they are
adequately evaluated and determined to be private financing candidates
and private financing is found or judged to be highly likely; and
ensure that financing options for future commercialization projects are
properly analyzed.
Agency Comments and NASA and OMB generally believe that our analysis and report provides a
useful review of these space commercialization efforts. This review willOur Evaluation	 be helpful in the future, given the newness of such activities and the
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broad variety of available financing options. OMB did not directly com-
ment on the recommendations, while NASA objected to being the sole
addressee of the recommendation in our draft report to keep projects in
the budget until they are adequately evaluated as private financing can-
didates. NASA suggested that we either withdraw the recommendation or
address it to OMB.
We recognize that OMB is a key player in approving NASA's budget. The
recommendation in the draft report was addressed only to NASA because
of its primary responsibility to justify its budget. However, because of
OMB's position that withholding the seven projects from the budget
request was part of a deliberate strategy to show the Administration's
commitment to pursue commercial financing, we modified the recom-
mendation to NASA to include its consultation with OMB.
In stating that withholding funding was part of an overall strategy to
attract serious private financing proposals, OMB invited us to comment
on that strategy and to suggest how it might be made more effective.
OMB described this strategy as obtaining expressions of interest and then
soliciting financing proposals, if the private interest was there.
We believe that all of our recommendations will help improve the future
implementation of this strategy without unnecessarily interrupting
ongoing research and development. Under our suggested approach,
weak or clearly unacceptable candidates would be screened out, and pri-
vate financing would be sought only for projects highly likely to attract
it. Then, a clear statement in the solicitation of private financing on each
candidate project could outline how the government would withdraw its
funding when private financing became available. We believe that this
process would send a strong signal of the government's intent. Certainly
it is a better approach than abruptly terminating budget funding
requests on projects before their commercial viability is known.
The full text of the NASA and OMB comments are included in appendixes I
and II, respectively, together with our responses to the agencies' com-
ments other than those summarized above.
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Appendix I
Comments From NASA
Mr. Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General
of the United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548
Dear Mr. Conahan:
Thank you for your May 16, 1990, letter soliciting NASA's
comments on the draft GAO report entitled SPACE PROJECTS:
Financing. NASA has expended significant efforts to attract
investment and make privatization a viable alternative. We
appreciate the additional insights and guidance that GAO has
provided by this report in exploring the process of selecting
candidates for increasing private sector participation in
civilian space activities.
The GAO analysis will prove useful in future situations
considering the lack of useful precedents and the almost
limitless variety of financing arrangements that must be
considered prior to the receipt of actual private sector
proposals. The candidate analysis and selection process is a
complex one that NASA must conduct in parallel with ongoing
research, development and technical progress.
Finally, we do not agree with GAO's determination that all
of the recommended corrective actions are within the control and
authority of the NASA Administrator to implement. Specifically,
NASA is not entirely a free agent in the decision processes
involved in formulating the content of the President's Budget.
Accordingly, we request that GAO reconsider and withdraw that
recommendation, or, alternatively, consider making the
recommendation to the Office of Management and Budget.
Enclosed are specific comments which we believe will add to
the usefulness of the report.
Sincerely,
r
John  E. O'Brien
Assistant Deputy Administrator
Enclosure
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NASA Comments On GAO Draft Report Entitled "SPACE PROJECTS:
Improvements Needed in Selecting Future Projects For Private
Financing"
See comment 1.
See comment 2.
See comment 1.
See comment 3.
The following specific comments are organized in the same format
as the subject draft report in order to facilitate cross-
referencing.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
The report does not recognize the significant efforts that NASA
expended to try to make commercialization of these facilities a
viable alternative. This is particularly true of the Extended
Duration Orbiter (EDO), which was successfully commercialized,
and the facility projects. The docking system and Telerobotic
Servicer were not good candidates as it turned out, however,
neither of these projects was adversely affected by their
consideration, as the privatization efforts were conducted in
parallel to their ongoing technical progress.
There is an implied assumption throughout the report that the
projects which were proposed for private financing were adversely
affected by this process. Specifically, on page 4, the report
notes that four of the projects have been delayed from our
original proposal. If they had not been proposed for private
financing, the report suggests that they would have been funded,
and retained their original schedules. This is not necessarily
the case.
The report also does not acknowledge that major efforts were
undertaken by NASA to attract private sector investment in the
facility projects and that the detailed cost benefit analyses
conducted by NASA prior to requesting formal proposals recognized
the specific need for potential investors to take an equity
interest in the projects to make them cost beneficial to the
Government.
Most Protects Were Not Good Candidates
We do not agree with the conclusion that some of the facility
projects were too far into development to be considered for
private sector investment. Deliberate decisions were made by
NASA to carry out the final design of the Space Station
Processing Facility and the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory to ensure
that the extremely stringent technical and operational safety
requirements were fully met and to permit earlier construction
start dates if successful offers were received.
Enclosure
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See comment 4.
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Comments From NASA
Problems With the Analyses of the Rocket Motor Plant Proposal
The draft report states that NASA did not adequately address the
interest rate risk associated with financing a long-term project
utilizing short-term money sources, and includes cases where the
private-borrowing rate was assumed to be lower than the
Government's rate. The analysis of the successful Advanced Solid
Rocket Motor (ASRM) offerors proposal, which was a part of the
Source Evaluation Board (SEB) evaluation, considered risks
associated with interest rate fluctuations over the life of the
project. Comparison charts were included which reflected an
interest cost range comparison reflecting financing costs for a
variety of interest rate changes. The assumed lower rates, when
compared to Government rates, were based on the contractor's
proposal and reflected plans to sell short-term notes at the most
favorable market rates for varying maturities from 30 up to 180
days in lieu of the 180-day Government maturity. period. The'
discount rate utilized represented the rate determined based on
criteria established by OMB Circular A-104 at the time of the
contractor's proposal . Therefore, the analyses included a
variety of interest and discount rate assumptions, and were based
on the best data, and methodology that was available.
DESCRIPTIONS AND ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT COSTS OF CANDIDATE
PROJECTS
The purpose of the Extended Duration Orbiter Cryogenic Pallet is
to provide additional consumables for power generation and for
life support. These additional consumables consist of storage
tanks containing liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen. The pallet,
along with the other modifications to the Orbiter, will extend
mission duration, beginning on day 9, to 16 days.
MOST INITIATIVES TO OBTAIN PRIVATE FINANCING FOR SPACE PROJECTS
WERE UNSUCCESSFUL
The third paragraph is incomplete. The NASA analyses identified
the exposure to financing risk in terms of both real year cost
and present value. GAO was consulted prior to receipt of
proposals for analytical techniques that might be used, but no
guidance was offered. However, certain GAO data were included
in the models.
COMMERCIALIZATION PROJECTS WERE SELECTED BEFORE BEING ADEQUATELY
EVALUATED
The report states that there only one potential EDO flight. More
accurately, there is currently only one dedicated commercial
flight and numerous potential shared payloads (primarily
Spacehab).
Enclosure
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See comment 7.
See comment 8.
See comment 9.
PROBLEMS WITH ANALYSES OF THE PRIVATE FINANCING PROPOSAL FOR THE
ADVANCE SOLID ROCKET MOTOR FACILITY
The second sentence should be clarified. That is, the net
present value difference was not significant because it was well
below the threshold of accuracy of the best OMB and GAO data and
methodology that was available at that time.
Private Financing Recommended for the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor
Facility
It should be noted that the insignificance of the present value
analysis differential was due to the accuracy threshold of the
analytical model. Whereas the various present value analyses
showed differences on the order of 4 percent, the methodology and
data are probably no better than 10-15 percent. GAO should also
note that continued use of the current motors is expected to be
more costly than the ASRM, and that ASRM stretch-out would,
therefore, increase the ASRM cost and the total Shuttle cost as
well. The fifth paragraph under this section should be changed
to note that NASA's present-value analysis contained a wide range
of assumptions about interest and discount rates.
NASA's Analyses Used an Incorrect Relationship Between Private
Interest and Government Discount Rates and Did Not Adequately
Address Interest-Rate Risk
NASA believes that this statement is incorrect and should be
deleted. As noted previously, appropriate data were utilized and
reflected in NASA's analyses.
In the second paragraph, the conditions used in the baseline case
were, in fact, the conditions existent at the time the proposal
was received. A wide variety of other cases were compared, some
at the request of Congressional staff members. NASA's reports
stated emphatically that (a) the actual cost of financing would
be greater for private financing, (b) the net present value
analyses, for all cases, resulted in differentials that were
below the threshold of significance based upon analytical
accuracy, and (c) interest rate variation risk was accommodated
in the budgeting.
PRIVATE FINANCING PLAN FOR THE EXTENDED DURATION ORBITER PALLET
GAO reports that all seven projects were reinstated in the
budget. The EDO project was not reinstated, and a successful
commercial agreement was negotiated. The report should be
updated to reflect that this agreement has since been completed
(see also pages 15 and 21). NASA's pricing policy for the
extended duration of orbiter was established in May, 1990.
Enclosure
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The following are GAo's comments on NASA's letter dated June 28, 1990.
GAO Comments	 1. We believe the report adequately summarizes such efforts on all theprojects, considering that they were mostly carried out after the projects
were removed from the budget request. Had the projects been screened
in advance, most of them would probably not have been selected as pri-
vate financing candidates.
2. NASA is correct. To what extent, if any, these projects would have been
funded in fiscal year 1990 cannot be known. However, in its fiscal year
1990 budget request, NASA generally presented these projects as being
worthy of funding and indicated that it would attempt to commercialize
them as part of its efforts to provide opportunities for private invest-
ment in space infrastructure. But, by prematurely deleting them from
the budget request before their viability as commercial projects was ade-
quately understood and reasonably established, NASA was—in effect—
gambling that private investors could be found. NASA lost that gamble on
these four projects. On the other hand, if the projects had been properly
screened for commercialization potential and, as a result, had remained
in the budget, the Congress would have been able to consider them along
with all of NAsA's other funding needs in judging the size, content, and
pace of NASA's 1990 activities.
3. After considering NASA's comment, we have deleted reference in the
report to the weightlessness laboratory's being too far into development.
In the case of the processing facility, three firms indicated interest in
shared use if it could be modified to accommodate their needs. One firm
said that 100,000 to 150,000 additional square feet might be needed to
enhance joint commercial and government use of the facility. The classi-
fication of "too far into development" relates to the costs associated
with redesigning the already partly designed, smaller facility.
4. Our report recognizes that NASA's analysis included sensitivity testing
on a wide range of private interest and government discount rates.
NASA's analysis showed that the cost of private financing would be about
$16 million more than government financing in present value dollars
and noted that interest costs would increase about $15 million in undis-
counted dollars for every 1 percent increase in the interest rate. But
NASA's final analysis did not highlight the present value impact of these
potential interest rate changes—specifically, that a private interest rate
increase of 1 percent, applied over the life of the loan, would cost the
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government $ 27 million more for private financing, with all other fac-
tors constant. We believe such an analysis would have put the govern-
ment's interest rate risk in a more appropriate perspective. The
government's potential exposure to periodically redetermined interest
rates was significant. It should have been more directly and thoroughly
addressed in NASA's analysis, since it helps illustrate the impact of that
exposure and the effect of potential private investors' shifting risk nor-
mally assumed by them to the government. Also, it is not an inconsider-
able amount of money.
5. We revised and expanded the description of the extended duration
orbiter pallet.
6. We included NASA's comment in the report.
7. We have revised the report to incorporate NASA's comment that the
net present value difference was not significant because it was well
below the threshold of accuracy, given the data and methodology. NASA's
concern about the estimating error is precisely why sensitivity testing is
so important. It helps to illustrate our point about the importance of
presenting the results of such testing in ways that clearly provide a
measure of the potential effects if basic assumptions about interest rates
fail to hold, as discussed in comment 4.
NASA stated that continued use of the current motors is expected to be
more costly than using the advanced motors and that stretching out the
transition to the advanced motors would increase total shuttle program
costs. We included this statement in the report. NASA suggested that the
fifth paragraph of this section of the report should note that NASA's pre-
sent value analysis contained a wide range of assumptions about
interest rates. The referenced paragraph was already clear in that
regard.
8. We continue to believe that the statement in our report is correct. The
basic issue is how data were presented in NASA's report. NASA should
have recognized the inappropriate relationship between the private and
government interest rates and should have more clearly identified and
discussed the additional interest rate risk and potential additional cost
of the private financing option.
9. We have included the more current information in the report.
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end of this appendix. LL	 a	 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
JUN 2 g 1990
Mr. Frank Conahan
Director
Federal Management Issues
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
Dear Mr. Conahan:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft GAO
Report entitled, Space Projects: Improvements Needed in
Selecting Future Projects for Private Financing. The
Administration is strongly committed to encouraging the
commercial use of space through a wide range of activities. The
GAO has chosen to review one commercial space issue that we deem
very important, i.e., private sector participation in space
infrastructure.
I would like to make three general observations on the
Report, as well as several specific comments.
Policies and programs to encourage the commercial use of space i
relatively new. Consequently, some failures can and should be
expected. Even though six of the seven projects proposed for
private financing were not successful, it is important to note
that a number of important successes have been achieved in other
areas of commercial space policy.
o	 Federal agencies are now procuring launch services
provided by the private sector.
o	 NASA is in the process of procuring commercial services
for a payload module for the Space Shuttle.
o	 NASA has signed agreements to make the Shuttle External
Tanks available to private interests.
o	 The Centers for the Commercial Development of Space
have made great progress in attracting private sector
participation in developing projects with potential
commercial applications.
The Administration believes very strongly in the importance
of developing a commercial space industry through these and other
initiatives. The National Space Council is planning a review of
Federal commercial space policy with the aim of building upon the
Nation's successes and learning the lessons from unsuccessful
ventures.
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2. The Key to Private Participation in Space
Infrastructure Proiects is the Potential for Alternative use, and
the Government Must Develop Effective Strategies to Evaluate and
Encourage Multiple Use of Such Assets. The actions taken by NASA
and OMB were part of an overall strategy to assess the potential
for alternative use of the projects and the feasibility of
private financing. This strategy consisted of: first, obtaining
expressions of interest; and second, if such expressions were
received, to proceed with a solicitation for financing proposals.
Federal funding for the seven projects was withheld from the
budget in order to demonstrate the Administration's commitment to
pursue private financing, and to encourage private firms to
commit the time and effort necessary to develop serious
proposals. The draft report raises criticisms of, and makes
specific recommendation on, certain elements of this strategy.
However, the report fails to address the efficacy of the overall
strategy. For example, the draft report recommends that funding
for future candidate projects be retained in the budget, without
addressing the possible negative implications for private firms
that might otherwise have an interest in participation. We
believe that the final report should address the overall
strategy, and, we would welcome any suggestions for making it
more effective.
3.
to Reduce the Federal Budget. The draft report may leave the
impression that these projects may have been proposed for private
financing only as a way of reducing the budget. These proposals
were not proposed as budget savers. In fact, the FY 1990 budget
proposals contained in the February 8th "Building a Better
America" included a 22 percent increase for NASA. Had the seven
proposals been included in the budget, the increase would have
been only slightly higher.
The primary objective of the proposals was to achieve
increased private sector participation in the planning,
management, financing and operation of national space
infrastructure.
Specific Comments
The GAO review is most thorough. However, we wish to point
out several problems with the report.
See comment 1.
The fundamental conclusion of the report is that none
of these projects were successfully commercialized.
This is not true. Private financing of the Extended
Duration Orbiter Cryogenic Pallet was successfully
concluded, and a viable proposal for the Observational
Instruments Laboratory (at the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory) was received. However, Congress would not
grant permission for this project to proceed.
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See comment 2.
See comment 3.
See comment 4.
o	 The report notes that "over half of the projects were
believed to be too far along in development to modify
them for commercial use without added expense and
delay". Yet, all of these projects were proposed in
the FY 1990 budget which, by definition, means that
they were in the preliminary stages of definition
and/or development. The Report does not resolve these
seemingly contradictory statements. In fact, NASA made
every effort to insure that commercial considerations
could be taken into account in a timely way.
o	 There is also an implied conclusion that these projects
were somehow adversely affected by proposals to seek
private financing, and if private financing had not
been sought, the projects would have been funded and
would have proceeded "on schedule". We point out that
the projects were selected with full consideration of
the schedule implications. Moreover, Congress had not
funded two of the projects in previous budgets, and
even when provided with an opportunity to do so in FY
1990, Congress did not fund the two Space Station
facilities.
o	 The report concludes that private investment was not
forthcoming because the private sector perceived few or
no commercial markets for them. This conclusion is
overstated. NASA received many expressions of interest
in the two Space Station facilities, and received
specific proposals on five of the seven projects.
Unfortunately, in most cases, the proposals were not
economically viable because of the unwillingness of the
private sector to accept an appropriate level of risk.
We believe that the GAO report represents a useful review of
the proposals to seek private financing for space infrastructure,
especially considering how few the precedents and how many the
permutations of financing arrangements. We expect that there
will be continued Administration and Congressional interest in
space commercialization where it is feasible, and we look forward
to receiving GAO's final recommendations in that regard.
Sincere
Rob r E. Gr
Director
a^
forAsso iate
Natur Resoirces, Energy
and science
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The following are GAO's comments on the OMB letter dated June 29, 1990.
GAO Comments	 1. There is no such "fundamental conclusion" in the report. The report
clearly recognizes that NASA has successfully commercialized the
extended duration orbiter cryogenic pallet. Private financing for the
observational instruments processing laboratory was rejected because
NASA officials decided that the facility would not be amenable to shared
use. Also, bringing a private investor aboard after preliminary engi-
neering had been completed could have delayed construction and
increased costs in order to adapt the design to accommodate commercial
uses. Furthermore, private financing would have been about 10 percent
more costly than government financing.
2. OMB is correct in pointing out that all the projects were in some stage
of development; however, that fact does not contradict the classification
of some of them as being "too far along in development." That classifi-
cation refers to those projects where significant design costs had
already been incurred, and modifications to adapt them to commercial
uses would have meant possibly incurring redesign costs and, perhaps,
schedule delays also. For example, a potential private developer of the
space station payload processing facility suggested possibly increasing
the total square footage of the facility by more than 20 percent in order
to accommodate potential commercial users.
3. To what extent, if any, these projects would have been funded in
fiscal year 1990 cannot be known. However, had they remained in the
budget request, the Congress would have been able to consider them
along with all of NASA's other funding needs in judging the size, content,
and pace of NASA's 1990 activities.
4. Our report clearly recognizes the extent to which private investors
expressed interest in the projects. However, the financing proposals
were almost exclusively limited to lending the government money. The
potential private investors were generally not interested in an owner-
ship interest because, in part, they perceived insufficient or no commer-
cial markets for the projects. If they had, they would have been more
likely to have developed proposals indicating a willingness to accept an
"appropriate level of risk."
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